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CHOICE OF LAW FOR CONSTRUING RELEASES
OF FEDERAL STATUTORY CLAIMS
Congress rarely prescribes the rules of decision for all matters relating to
the operation of a federal statutory program.' Federal courts, therefore, often
must decide whether state or federal law governs issues that arise from the
implementation of a federal statute.2 One such issue concerns whether a party
validly has waived a federal statutory claim against another party through the
1. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "'Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957) (concept of
totally self-sufficient legislative enactment is unrealistic because of practical limits on time and
human foresight); see also Comment, Federal Judicial Law-Making Power: Competence as a
Function of Cognizable Federal Interests, 18 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 171, 179 (1976) (it is
virutally impossible for Congress to enact statute that gives definitive treatment to all relationships
and transactions involved in operation of statutory program) [hereinafter cited as Federal Judicial
Law-Making Power]. Although most federal statutory enactments do not specify whether state or
federal law will govern issues arising out of the implementation of the statute, several federal
statutes do expressly provide the substantive rule of decision for certain statutory issues. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (1982) (prescribing rules governing determinations of family status under
Social Security Act); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672, 2674 (1982) (incorporating state law as rule of
decision in cases arising under Federal Tort Claims Act); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1), (c)(1) (1982) (law
of domicile of child or father determines legitimacy of child under Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act).
2. See Mishkin, supra note 1, at 800 (federal courts have power to declare governing law
for issues substantially related to operation of federal program). Since Congress generally does not
enact a comprehensive piece of legislation, the effective implementation of federal statutory
schemes requires the recognition of federal judicial "competence" to declare the applicable law
for resolving issues incidental to the operation of a federal statute. Id.; see supra note I and ac-
companying text (Congress usually does not prescribe rules for deciding all matters related to
operation of federal statutory scheme).
"Competence" denotes the prerogative of federal courts to declare the rule of decision in
cases not'involving a federal question. See generally Note, The Competence of the Federal Courts
to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1085-88 (1964) (discussing federal
judicial competence to choose governing law). The Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
determined that federal courts lack competence to choose the governing law for issues arising
under state law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts have no power
to declare substantive rules of law regarding issues of local nature). The rule of Erie is that federal
courts must apply state rules of decision when the source of the plaintiff's underlying right is state
law. Id.; see also Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) (federal courts
must apply state law when cause of action derives from state law).
Although federal courts lack competence to choose the governing law in cases which the
plaintiff's underlying right is founded on state law, theErie rule does not apply when the source of
the right sued upon is a federal statute. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942) (federal courts need not apply state law in defining legal relations affected by federal
statute); see also Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296, 300 (1975) (source of right sued upon determines
applicable law in federal court). Federal courts, therefore, may choose the applicable law for
issues relating to the operation of a federal statutory scheme. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal courts have power to fashion governing law for issues
related to federal program).
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execution of a release or a settlement agreement. 3 Releases and settlement
agreements are bilateral contracts whereby one party relinquishes a right of
action against another party, usually in exchange for some form of considera-
tion. 4 Since the execution of a release or settlement agreement extinguishes
one party's legal claim against another party, the existence of a valid release
or settlement contract is a defense to a suit brought on the same cause of ac-
tion.5
Although federal courts consistently apply federal law to determine the
validity of most defenses to federal rights of action, 6 federal courts have
In Clearfield, the Supreme Court indicated that federal courts may either choose to incor-
porate state law as the rule of decision, or develop a uniform federal law to resolve issues arising
from the implementation of a federal statute. Id. When adopting state law would lead to undue di-
versity and uncertainty in determining rights and duties under a federal statute, the Court in Clear-
field stated that federal courts must apply uniform federal law. Id.; see infra notes 121-24 and ac-
companying text (discussing need for uniformity as justification for choosing to apply federal law
rather than state law to statutory issues). See generally Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-33 (discussing
Supreme Court decision in Clearfield).
3. See, e.g., Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 113-16 (4th Cir.
1983) (court determined whether unilateral mistake in execution of settlement agreement in patent
infringement case was sufficient to set aside agreement); Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth,
673 F.2d 1178, 1180 (11 th Cir. 1982) (court examined validity of alleged release of plaintiff's claim
under Truth in Lending Act); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203-06 (9th Cir. 1981) (court con-
strued validity of alleged release of plaintiff's claim under Civil Rights Act); United States v. Orr
Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1977) (court considered enforceability of settlement
agreement in suit brought under Miller Act); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1368-69
(6th Cir. 1975) (court ruled on validity of release of plaintiff's claim under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 888-97 (3d Cir.
1975) (court considered whether plaintiff validly had released antitrust claims against defendant
under Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act); Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., 569 F. Supp.
621, 628-29 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (court examined enforceability of release of claim under antitrust
laws); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 532 F. Supp. 923, 931-33 (D. Minn. 1982) (court
considered whether parties had reached valid agreement to settle patent infringement claim);
Okonko v. Union Oil Co. of California, 519 F. Supp. 372, 378 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (court ruled on
whether settlement agreement barred plaintiff's Title VII discrimination suit).
4. See Melo v. National Fuse & Power Co., 267 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D. Colo. 1967) (release
is surrender of cause of action to party against whom claim exists). A party may release a claim
either gratuitously or in exchange for some form of consideration. Id. Releases typically are ex-
ecuted after the claim arises, but before the plaintiff files an action in court based on the claim. See
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 240-41 (1942) (plaintiff executed alleged release
of claim against employer under Jones Act shortly after plaintiff was injured). In contrast, most
settlement agreements are negotiated subsequent to the initiation of legal proceedings, but prior to
the rendering of a judgment. See Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th
Cir. 1981) (parties negotiated settlement agreement during pendency of lawsuit based on Title VII
employment discrimination claim).
5. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 160 (1960) (defendant
tendered release that plaintiff had signed as defense to plaintiff's claim under Federal Employers'
Liability Act); Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th Cir. 1981) (defen-
dant in Title VII employment discrimination suit raised defense that parties had executed valid set-
tlement agreement); Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 827, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (defen-
dants pleaded general release that plaintiffs had executed as defense to antitrust claim). The ex-
istence of a valid release or settlement agreement is an affirmative defense under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P..8(c) (release of cause of action is affirmative defense).
6. See, e.g., Thurber v. Western Conf. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d 1106, 1108
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reached divergent results concerning whether state or federal law should
govern the validity of releases of federal statutory claims.7 The failure of the
courts to agree on whether state or federal law controls the enforceability of
releases of federal claims derives from the fact that such releases implicate
both state and federal interests.8 Since the execution of a release abrogates a
party's federally created rights, releases may undermine important federal
concerns regarding the effectuation of policy under remedial statutory pro-
grams.' State governments also have a legitimate interest in the enforceability
of releases because the states traditionally have regulated the contractual ac-
tivities of private parties." Most federal courts that have confronted the issue
(9th Cir. 1976) (federal law controls issue of whether defense of estoppel is available in action
brought pursuant to Labor Management Relations Act); Baker v. F&F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191,
1193 n.3 (7th Cir.) (applicability of doctrine of laches in actions based on federally created causes
of action is matter of federal law), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); Shellburne Inc. v. New Castle
County, 293 F. Supp. 237, 242 (D. Del. 1968) (federal law governs limits of immunity of govern-
ment officials sued under Civil Rights Act); see also Locofrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys.
Leasing, Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 1977) (federal law governs all questions relating to
validity of defenses to federal statutory claims).
7. Compare Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 673 F.2d 1178, 1180 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that federal law governs validity of releases of antitrust claims) and Fulgence v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208-09 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that federal law controls
validity of settlement agreements in employment discrimination suits brought under Title VII)
with Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 890-92 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding
that Pennsylvania law governs interpretation of release of antitrust claim) and Okonko v. Union
Oil Co., 519 F. Supp. 372, 378 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that California law governs validity of
settlement agreement in employment discrimination suit brought pursuant to Title VII). See
generally Comment, Displacement of State Rules of Decision in Construing Releases of Federal
Claims, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 339, 343-45 (1978) (federal courts have reached different conclusions
regarding whether state law or federal law governs interpretation of releases of federal statutory
claims) [hereinafter cited as Releases of Federal Claims].
8. See Releases of Federal Claims, supra note 7, at 353 (releases of federal claims occupy
region between exclusively state and exclusively federal concerns).
9. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952) (devices
such as releases which serve to liquidate plaintiff's federal claim are important to adminstration of
federal statutory policy). Releases and settlement agreements of claims pursuant to federal remed-
ial legislation may compromise federal policy under such legislation by extinguishing a claimant's
substantive right of recovery, thereby raising the possibility that the claimant may not be ade-
quately compensated for his injury. See Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 7 (1942) (instruments
which surrender statutory rights of recovery may deprive party of only means available for enforc-
ing liability provisions of federal acts). Federal policies of deterence and compensation, therefore,
could be subverted if courts enforce improper releases or inequitable settlements. See Jones v.
Tabor, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (releases of Civil Rights Act claims implicate im-
portant federal policies of deterence and compensation); cf. Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d
1367, 1368-69 (6th Cir. 1975) (question of validity of release in action pursuant to Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) determined according to federal law since federal law controls
any method employers use to avoid liability under ADEA).
10. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 891 (3d Cir. 1975) (states
have significant interest in enforceability of releases since state rules customarily control formula-
tion of such agreements); see also Novak v. General Elec. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1016 (E.D.
Pa. 1967) (state law usually governs interpretation of releases and other contracts). In areas tradi-
tionally of local concern, such as private contractual activities, states usually have developed a
detailed body of substantive law defining relationships and imposing prohibitions on various types
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of whether state or federal law controls the validity of releases of federal
claims, however, have decided the issue without analyzing how the choice of
applicable law might impair either state or federal interests." Specifically,
courts usually do not examine whether the use of state law to interpret a
release of a federal statutory claim would undermine a federal policy implicit
in the statutory scheme, or conversely, whether the displacement of state law
by a federal rule would threaten a state's legitimate interest in regulating the
contractual relations of its citizens. I2 Some courts have applied federal law to
construe releases of federal claims merely by reasoning that the release's
validity was a federal question.' 3 Other courts have held that state law
of behavior. See Comment, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed
Test, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 823, 842 (1976) (states typically create detailed rules governing relation-
ships in areas of traditional local concern). Imposing federal rules on activities traditionally sub-
ject to state law could cause a significant disruption of state regulation of these activities. Id.
States, therefore, have a legitimate interest in preventing the unwarranted displacement of state
law by federal law in matters customarily of local concern such as private contractual relations. Id.
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1975) (summarily holding that
federal law governed validity of release of antitrust claim); Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v.
SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that Virginia law controlled interpreta-
tion of release of antitrust claim without explaining reason for choosing to apply state law), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Bafico v. Southern Pac. Co., 364 F.2d 36, 37-38 (9th Cir. 1966) (ap-
plying state law to construe release of claim under Federal Employers' Liability Act without ex-
plaining reason for choosing state rule), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967). See generally Releases
of Federal Claims, supra note 7, at 343-45 (few cases dealing with choice of law for construing
releases of federal claims analyze implications of choosing either state or federal law).
12. See, e.g., Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying
federal law to construe validity of release waiving rights under Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) because federal law must govern any method employers use to avoid application of
ADEA); Reed v. Smithkline Beckman Corp., 569 F. Supp. 672, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying
Pennsylvania law to interpret validity of release of employment discrimination claim because
plaintiff's allegations that release was invalid due to duress and coercion raised issues of state
law); Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (applying federal
law rather than state law to construe alleged release of antitrust claim because federal law controls
all legal relations that federal statute affects including execution of antitrust releases).
13. See United States v. Orr Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
federal law governs interpretation of agreements that waive plaintiff's rights to sue contractor for
payment on bond pursuant to Miller Act); Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 827,
830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (holding that federal law controls construction of releases of antitrust
claims); see also Barninger v. National Maritime Union, 372 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(reasoning that federal law determines validity of releases of claims under Labor Management
Relations Act because plaintiffs' underlying rights arose from federal statute).
In United States v. Orr Constr. Co., the Seventh Circuit held that federal law governs the
validity of a settlement agreement in an action brought under the Miller Act on the ground that the
scope of plaintiff's remedies under the Miller Act is a federal question. See 560 F.2d 765, 768 (7th
Cir. 1977); 40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(b) (1982) (Miller Act requires contractor for federal building to
furnish bond and permits any person who supplied labor or materials in construction of building
to sue in federal court for payment on bond). The court in Orr reasoned that to construe the settle-
ment agreement according to state law would be anomolous since federal law provided the juris-
dictional basis for the suit. See 560 F.2d at 669. But see Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 621, 629 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (federal courts properly may apply federal law to determine some
issues in antitrust suit and use state law to interpret validity of alleged release of antitrust claim).
In contrast to the reasoning in Orr, the Fourth Circuit in Gamewell Manufacturing, Inc. v.
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governs the validity of releases of federal statutory claims because a release is
simply a form of private contract, and therefore subject to state rules of con-
struction." In only a few cases have courts squarely confronted the issue of
whether state or federal law controls the enforceability of agreements purpor-
ting to release a party's federal rights of action against another.'"
The Supreme Court cases that have examined whether state or federal law
should be applied to construe releases of federal statutory claims have focused
on the existence of a conflict between state law and federal statutory policy in-
terests.' 6 For example, in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,'7 the United
HVAC Supply, Inc. held that regardless of the jurisdictional basis of a suit, federal law controls
the interpretation of releases and settlement agreements executed during the pendency of the litiga-
tion in federal court. See 715 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1983). The Gamewell court reasoned that
releases and settlements executed while a federal suit was in progress implicated important federal
procedural interests distinct from the underlying substantive rights of the parties. Id. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that federal law must control any method of resolving federal litigation short of
an actual adjudication on the merits. Id.; cf. Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363 F.2d 1002,
1007 (2d Cir. 1966) (federal interest in protecting courts from repetitive and burdensome assertion
of patent infringement claims requires application of federal rule that encourages releases of such
claims).
14. See Okonko v. Union Oil Co., 519 F. Supp. 372, 378 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (state law con-
trols validity of settlement agreements in employment discrimination suits because settlement is
form of contract to which local law generally applies); see also Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n
v. Fairfax County, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir.) (state law governs validity of settlement
agreements in Title VII suits since such agreements are merely contracts executed after negotiations
between private parties), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); but see Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 532 F. Supp. 923, 931-32 (D. Minn. 1982) (fact that settlement agreement basically is con-
tract not of controlling significance in resolving choice of law issue).
15. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 240-41 (1942) (holding that
federal law governed validity of purported release of claim under Jones Act); Fuglence v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1028-09 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that federal law controlled
validity of settlements in employment discrimination suits brought under Title VII); Three
Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 890-92 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that Penn-
sylvania law governed interpretation of release of antitrust claim).
Although federal courts disagree as to whether state or federal law governs the enforceability
of releases and settlements of federal statutory claims, the Supreme Court in a pair of cases held
that federal law must control the effect of a release on joint tortfeasors. In Aro Manufacturing
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. the Court held that an agreement releasing one joint
tortfeasor under a patent infringement claim does not release other alleged patent infringers unless
the plaintiff clearly intended to release the other joint tortfeasors. See 377 U.S. 476, 500-01 (1964).
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. that in an-
titrust cases, a plaintiff releases only those joint tortfeasors .whom the plaintiff intends to release.
See 401 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1971). Courts have extended theAro and Zenith decisions to releases of
joint tortfeasors in other federal causes of action. See Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 415-16
(5th Cir. 1971) (applying joint tortfeasor rule of Zenith to release of admiralty claim); see also
Weiderhold v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 368 F. Supp. 1054, 1058-60 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (citing Zenith in
applying joint tortfeasor rule to releases of claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act).
16. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); infra notes 17-55 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court decisions in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. and Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R.R.).
17. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
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States Supreme Court held that federal law must control the validity of re-
leases of claims under the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act).18 The Jones Act
establishes a right of action for seamen who suffer personal injury due to the
negligence of their employer.' 9 In Garrett, a seaman filed suit in Pennsylvania
state court 20 pursuant to section 33 of the Jones Act for injuries received while
working aboard the defendant's vessel.2 ' As a defense to the action, the
defendant shipowner alleged that the plaintiff had signed a release of all
claims against the defendant in return for a sum of money.22 The plaintiff,
however, asserted that the purported release was invalid because the defen-
dant had procured the release while the plaintiff was under the influence of
pain-killing drugs.
23
Although the jury found for the plaintiff on the Jones Act claim, 24 the
trial court entered a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the
verdict.25 Applying Pennsylvania law, the trial court found that the plaintiff
had failed to sustain the burden of proving the invalidity of the purported
release. 26 After the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's
decision, 27 the United States Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition
for certiorari. 28 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, holding that the Pennsylvania courts erred in
18. See id. at 248.
19. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
20. See 317 U.S. at 240. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to try cases arising under
the Jones Act. See id. at 243; see also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37 (1926) (state courts have
jurisdiction to enforce rights of action under Jones Act).
21. See 317 U.S. at 240. The plaintiff in Garrett claimed that he was injured when struck by
a hatch cover that allegedly fell because of the defendant's negligence. See id. at 240-41. The
defendant contested the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, and further maintained that the plaintiff
had received his injuries during a barroom brawl in Copenhagen. See id. at 241.
22. See ie. at 241.
23. Id. In addition to claiming that the release was void because the plaintiff was drugged
when he signed the document, the plaintiff in Garrett further contended that the release was in-
valid because the defendant has used threats of imprisonment to procure the plaintiff's signature.
Id. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that the money he received in exchange for signing the alleged
release actually was a payment for wages. Id. The plaintiff, therefore, argued that the purported
release was void because of a lack of consideration. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 241-42. Under Pennsylvania law, one who attacks the validity of a release must
prove by "clear, precise and indubitable" evidence that the release is void. See id. at 241. The trial
court in Garrett conceded that in admiralty cases, the burden is on the defendant to prove the
validity of a document that purports to waive the plaintiff's admiralty claim. See id. The trial
court, however, reasoned that since the plaintiff had chosen to bring his admiralty claim in state
court, state law rather than admiralty principles governed the validity of the alleged release. See id.
27. See 317 U.S. at 242. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Garrett noted that
federal law governs most issues involving federally created rights, the court reasoned that state law
controlled the allocation of the burden of proof respecting releases because such an issue was a
procedural matter not affecting the substantive rights of the parties. See id.
28. See id. at 239.
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applying Pennsylvania law rather than federal law to determine the release's
validity.2 9
The Garrett Court stressed that the Jones Act must have uniform applica-
tion throughout the nation to ensure the preservation of remedies provided
under the Act.30 According to the Garrett Court, state courts trying cases
brought under the Jones Act must not substantially alter the availability of
remedies afforded injured seamen under the Act.' The Court reasoned that
to permit a state court to deny federally established rights would contravene
the intention of Congress because the purpose of the Jones Act was to secure
a remedy for injured seamen.12 The Garrett Court stated that the Pennsylvania
courts therefore were bound to proceed in a manner that preserved and pro-
tected the plaintiff's substantive rights under the Jones Act.33
The Supreme Court found, however, that the use of state law by the
Pennsylvania courts to determine the validity of the alleged release was incon-
sistent with the federal policy implicit in the Jones Act of safeguarding the
legal rights of injured seamen .3 The Court stated that seamen are considered
wards of the admiralty, and traditionally have been accorded special protec-
tion when contracting for wages or other benefits.33 In view of this policy of
protecting seamen's rights, the Garrett Court reasoned that a seaman who at-
tacks a purported release of his claim under the Jones Act should not have the
29. Id. at 249.
30. Id. at 244; see Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924) (operation of Jones
Act across nation must be uniform). The Garrett Court noted that the Jones Act is based upon the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, which the Court had held must be interpreted uniformly. See
317 U.S. at 244; 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (Federal Employers' Liability Act); infra note 53 and ac-
companying text (Supreme Court's discussion in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. con-
cerning need for uniform application of Federal Employers' Liability Act); see also Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 54 (1912) (enactment of Employers' Liability Act
supercedes state laws regarding liability of employers engaged in interstate commerce for injuries
their employees receive).
31. 317 U.S. at 245.
32. Id. at 245-46. The Supreme Court in Garrett stated that the objective of all legislation is
to assure litigants the full enjoyment of substantive rights afforded them under the statute. Id. at
245. Since Congress enacted the Jones Act with the intent of providing seamen with a panoply of
remedies against negligent employers, the Garrett Court reasoned that to permit state rules to cir-
cumscribe the availability of remedies under the Act would defy the intention of the legislature. Id.
at 245.
33. Id. at 245.
34. Id. at 246-49.
35. Id. at 246-47. The Garrett Court observed that Congress historically has sought to
safeguard the legal rights of seamen. Id. at 246. The Court noted, for example, that the first Con-
gress had passed an act protecting the wage contracts of seamen in the merchant service. Id. The
court also quoted extensively from the opinion of Justice Story in Harden v. Gordon in which he
described seamen as "wards of the admiralty", entitled to special protection by the courts. See id.
at 246-57; Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. 1823) (No. 6047). Additionally, the Gar-
rett Court stated that Congress specifically had acted to ensure that seamen do not inadvertently
release rights to compensation. See 317 U.S. at 247; 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1982) (seamen must sign
release for wages in presence of shipping commissioner); see also Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act of 1927, 33 U.S.C. §§ 915, 916 (1982) (all releases not executed under
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burden of establishing the invalidity of the release.36 Since the Pennsylvania
rule improperly allocated the burden of proving the release's invalidity to the
plaintiff seaman, the Garrett Court rejected the use of Pennsylvania law to
determine whether the plaintiff had validly released his Jones Act claim." The
Garrett Court instead fashioned a uniform federal rule placing the burden of
proving that the plaintiff validly released his claim under the Jones Act on the
defendant. 8
The Court in Garrett chose to apply a uniform federal rule in construing
the release to ensure that a seaman's rights of recovery under the Jones Act
are adequately protected.39 A similar concern for preserving the federally
created rights of injured employees prompted the Supreme Court in Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co." to apply a uniform federal rule
rather than state law to determine whether a plaintiff had validly released a
claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).4' The FELA grants
railroad employees a right to recover for injuries resulting from their
employer's negligence.42 In Dice, a railroad fireman sued the railroad com-
pany in a Ohio state court under the FELA for injuries received when the
engine in which the plaintiff was riding derailed."3 At trial, the defendant con-
tended that the plaintiff had signed a document purporting to release the
defendant from liability for a sum of money." While the plaintiff admitted to
having signed several documents including the alleged release, the plaintiff
claimed that the purported release was void because he had signed the instru-
ment relying on the defendant's misrepresentation that the document merely
was a receipt for back wages. 5 Although the jury found that the defendant
express terms of Act are void). Finally, the Court in Garrett stressed that federal courts have
carefully scrutinized seamen's releases in light of this established congressional policy of safe-
guarding seamen's rights. See 317 U.S. at 247-48; Harmon v. United States, 59 F.2d 372, 373 (5th
Cir. 1932) (party claiming that seamen has waived legal rights has burden of proving that seamen
knowingly and fairly executed release).
36. 317 U.S. at 248-49.
37. Id. at 248. The Garrett Court expressly rejected the reasoning of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that the allocation of the burden of proof was a procedural matter not affecting
the substantive rights of the parties. See id. at 249; supra note 27 (discussing reasoning of Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Garrett). The Garrett Court stressed that the right of the plaintiff to be
free of the burden of providing the release's invalidity was a substantial aspect of the plaintiff's
rights under the Jones Act. See 317 U.S. at 249; see also Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238
U.S. 507, 511-12 (1915) (allocation of burden of proof is not mere procedural matter).
38. See 317 U.S. at 248.
39. See id. at 246-48; see also Federal Judicial Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 195
(Supreme Court in Garrett invoked federal law to preserve rights created under Jones Act).
40. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
41. See id. at 362; 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (Federal Employers' Liability Act).
42. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
43. See 342 U.S. at 360.
44. See id.
45. See id. The plaintiff in Dice alleged that when he reported back to work after recovering
from his injuries, an employee of the defendant informed the plaintiff that he had to sign a docu-
ment releasing the defendant from claims for lost time and medical expenses before the plaintiff
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had fraudulently induced the plaintiff to sign the release, the trial court
entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict.4'6 The trial court held that
under Ohio law, the plaintiff's negligence in failing to read the release before
signing the document vitiated any fraud the defendant may have perpetrated.4 7
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, 4 but the Ohio
Supreme Court on appeal sustained the trial court's judgment. 9 The Court
determined that Ohio law rather than federal law governed the validity of the
alleged release on the ground that state law controls questions raised in state
court concerning the avoidance of releases.5 0
On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court held that the
validity of releases of claims under the FELA raised a federal question, re-
quiring the application of federal law rather than state law.' The Dice Court
reasoned that state law cannot control issues affecting federal substantive
rights guaranteed under the FELA because such rights could be defeated if
state law governed the propriety of defenses to claims under the Act. " The
Court stated that federal law must control the validity of releases of FELA
claims to ensure that the Act is applied uniformly throughout the country.
3
In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that the application of Ohio law
to defeat the plaintiff's claim was incongruous with the federal policy implicit
could return to work. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 155 Ohio St. 185,
- 98 N.E.2d 301, 302 (1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 359 (1952). The plaintiff, however, denied that he
understood the release to encompass all claims that the plaintiff had against the defendant. See id.
at -, 98 N.E.2d at 302. Instead, the plaintiff alleged that he relied on the representation of the
defendant's employee that the release covered only medical expenses and wages the plaintiff had
lost by reason of his injury. Id.
46. See 342 U.S. at 360.
47. See id.; McAdams v. McAdams, 80 Ohio St. 237, 240-41, 88 N.E. 542, 544 (1909) (per-
son cannot claim he was mislead into signing document when person could have discovered truth
by reading document).
48. See 342 U.S. at 360. Applying federal law, the Ohio Court of Appeals in Dice ruled that
the jury's verdict for the plaintiff must stand because sufficient evidence existed to support the
jury's finding of fraud by the defendant. See id. at 360-61.
49. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 155 Ohio St. 185, -_, 98 N.E.2d
301, 308 (1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
50. See id. at __ , 98 N.E.2d at 307-08. In holding that state law rather than federal law
controlled the question of whether the plaintiff in Dice validly had releases his FELA claim, the
Ohio Supreme Court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Callen v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co. at -, 98 N.E.2d at 305-08; Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625
(1948). In Callen, the Supreme Court stated that releases of federal claims under the FELA are no
different than any other releases. See 332 U.S. at 630. The Ohio Supreme Court in Dice reasoned
that the Callen decision indicates that state law also must govern releases of FELA claims. See 155
Ohio St. at -, 98 N.E.2d at 306.
51. 342 U.S. at 362.
52. Id. at 361.
53. Id.; see also Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44, 46-47 (1932) (state
courts trying cases under FELA must apply principles of federal common law); Second
Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1912) (Employers' Liability Act must receive
uniform interpretation throughout nation); Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 759
(2d Cir. 1946) (federal law governs effect of release of FELA claim on plaintiff's legal rights under
FELA).
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in the FELA of securing an employee's right to recover for injuries resulting
from the negligence of his employer."' The Dice Court, therefore, rejected
Ohio law in favor of a federal rule that a release of rights under the FELA is
void if the employer induced the employee to sign the release through false
and deceptive representations as to the nature of the document."
Other federal courts similarly have applied federal law to interpret the
validity of releases of federal statutory claims when employing a state rule of
construction would contravene an established federal policy. 6 For example,
in Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,57 the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt
Louisiana law in determining whether an oral settlement of a Title VII
employment discrimination suit was valid.58 Under section 2000e of Title VII,
an employee may sue his employer for engaging in discriminatory practices
with regard to hiring or terms and conditions of employment.9 The plaintiff
in Fulgence filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana pursuant to section 2000e of Title VII after the defen-
dant had terminated the plaintiff's employment. 60 During the pendency of the
litigation, the parties engaged in a series of negotiations with a view toward
settling the dispute.6 Although the negotiations produced a tentative agree-
ment to settle, the parties never formally executed the settlement agreement
because the plaintiff refused to sign the settlement documents.6 2 Nonetheless,
the district court granted the defendant's motion to enforce the unexecuted
54. See 342 U.S. at 362. The Court in Dice stated that applying Ohio law to construe the
validity of the release would work an injustice since the mere negligence of the injured employee in
failing to read the purported release permitted the employer to benefit from a deliberate fraud. Id.
55. See id.
56. See Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 673 F.2d 1178, 1180 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (apply-
ing federal law to determine validity of releases of claim under Truth in Lending Act (TILA) be-
cause use of state law to uphold release would have conflicted with public interest in enforcing
TILA requirements); Fuglence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th Cir. 1981)
(applying federal law to construe validity of oral settlement agreement in employment discrimina-
tion suit because use of state law to invalidate agreement would have contravened federal policy of
encouraging voluntary settlement of Title VII claims); Jones v. Tabor, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 n.1
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that federal law controls validity of releases of Title VII claims since ap-
plication of state law might conflict with federal policies of deterence and compensation implicit in
Civil Rights Act).
57. 662 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. See id. at 1208.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
60. See 662 F.2d at 1208.
61. See id.
62. Id. The plaintiff in Fulgence authorized his attorney to settle the Title VII litigation. Id.
After brief negotiations, the attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to settle the law-
suit for $1440. Id. When the plaintiff received the proposed settlement agreement, however, he ob-
jected to language that purported to release all of the plaintiff's rights against the defendant, in-
cluding a pending claim for disability benefits. Id. Although the defendant deleted the objec-
tionable terms, the plaintiff subsequently indicated that he did not wish to settle the suit, and
returned the settlement check and unexecuted settlement documents to the defendant. Id.
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settlement agreement against the plaintiff,63 holding that the plaintiff had
entered into a valid oral settlement agreement with the defendant."
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff argued that the oral settle-
ment agreement was unenforceable because Louisiana law required the parties
to reduce the settlement agreement to writing. 6- The Fifth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's contention .6 The court emphasized that while the use of state law
to determine the validity of settlement agreements in Title VII actions would
serve no substantial state interest, 67 applying Louisiana law as the rule of deci-
sion in Fulgence would undermine a significant federal policy interest in en-
couraging the voluntary settlement of Title VII claims.68 Moreover, the
Fulgence court noted that the Supreme Court had ruled that a settlement
agreement in a Title VII action is enforceable against a plaintiff who know-
ingly and voluntarily agreed to settle. 69 The court further reasoned that apply-
ing Louisiana law could frustrate federal policy by invalidating oral set-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1210. After an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to enforce the settlement
agreement, the district court in Fulgence determined that the plaintiff has expressly authorized his
attorney to settle the litigation, and also that the plaintiff had agreed to both the terms and
the amount of the amended settlement agreement. See id. at 1209. Additionally, the district court
found that negotiations leading up to the settlement were free of fraud, coercion, or overreaching
on the part of the defendant's attorney. Id. at 1209-10. The district court concluded that the par-
ties had validly agreed to settle the litigation despite the fact that the plaintiff later changed his
mind and refused to sign the agreement. See id.
65. See id. at 1209; LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (West 1982) (all transactions settling
lawsuits must be in writing).
66. See 662 F.2d at 1209.
67. Id. But see Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 891 (3d Cir.
1975) (states have legitimate interest in enforceability of releases since state law traditionally
governs private contracts such as releases); supra note 10 and accompanying text (state govern-
ments have significant interest in maintaining efficacy of state regulation of private contractual
activities).
68. See 662 F.2d at 1209; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate unlawful employment practices by informal methods
such as conference, concilliation, and persuasion); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1975) (great emphasis exists in Title VII cases on
private settlement as means of eliminating discriminatory employment practices), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976).
Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as a means
through which parties could avoid unnecessary litigation and voluntarily settle grievances under
Title VII. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1969) (aggrieved
party is required under Title VII to first file charge with EEOC as means of initiating informal
efforts to settle disputes); see also Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402
(5th Cir. 1969) (basic philosophy of statutory provisions creating EEOC is that voluntary com-
pliance with Title VII is preferable to litigation and that parties should make reasonable efforts
to resolve dispute through conciliation).
69. See 662 F.2d at 1209; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1979)
(employee must knowingly and voluntarily consent to settlement agreement that waives
employee's Title VII rights); see also Mosely v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 946
n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (valid waiver of rights under Title VII must be made knowingly, voluntarily,
and with sufficient awareness of likely consequences of waiver).
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tlements that were entered into knowingly and voluntarily."0 The Fulgence
court, therefore, concluded that the furtherance of federal policy required the
application of federal law rather than state law to determine the validity of
oral settlement agreements in Title VII suits. 7' Since oral settlement
agreements were enforceable under federal law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's determination that the plaintiff had entered into a valid settle-
ment agreement with the defendant.
7 2
Although courts have applied federal law to construe the validity of re-
leases of federal statutory claims when a federal rule would better serve the
policy goals of a federal statutory scheme, some courts have chosen to apply
state law when the use of the state rule would not impede the effectuation of
federal policy." For example, in Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor
Co.,7" the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania law to determine whether a
plaintiff's allegation of duress in the execution of a release of an antitrust
claim was sufficient to invalidate the release.7 The plaintiff in Three Rivers
filed suit against the defendant in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania claiming that the defendant had violated the
antitrust laws through an alleged price-fixing arrangement which encouraged
certain customers to purchase new automobiles from a dealership that the de-
fendant owned. 6 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the
70. See 662 F.2d at 1209. Since federal law does not require that settlement agreements be
in writing, the Fulgence court reasoned that the oral settlement agreement that the plaintiff
entered into voluntarily and knowingly should be enforceable against the plaintiff. See id.
71. Id. The Fulgence court noted that other federal courts had concluded that federal law
governs the enforceability of oral settlement agreements waiving federal statutory rights. Id. at
1209 n.2; see Strange v. Gulf & South Am. Steamship Co., 495 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th Cir. 1974)
(federal law governs validity of oral settlements of admiralty claims); Theatre Time Clock Co. v.
Motion Picture Advertising Corp., 323 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. La. 1971) (federal law controls
validity of oral settlement agreements in antitrust suits).
72. See 662 F.2d at 1210.
73. See, e.g., Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 891 (3d Cir.
1975) (applying Pennsylvania law to interpret alleged release of antitrust claim because use of
state rule would not contravene federal antitrust policy); Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 621, 629 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (applying Wisconsin law to construe validity of release in anti-
trust action because application of state law would not frustrate statutory scheme); Novak v.
General Elec. Co., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (applying Pennsylvania law to deter-
mine whether plaintiff had released antitrust claim because use of state law would affirmatively
support federal antitrust objectives).
74. 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
75. See id. at 891.
76. See id. at 887-88. The plaintiff in Three Rivers had operated an automobile dealership
under a Ford franchise agreement. See id. at 887. After several years of losses resulting in part
from competition with another Ford franchised dealership in the area, the plaintiff sought to re-
sign the franchise. Id. Under the terms of the franchise agreement, the defendant repurchased the
plaintiff's inventory in exchange for the plaintiff's execution of a general release. Id. Three years
after the execution of the release, the plaintiff filed suit claiming that the defendant had engaged in
price fixing in violation of the Clayton Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982) (Clayton Act prohibits
price discrimination by any person engaged in interstate commerce).
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ground that a general release the plaintiff had signed several years earlier bar-
red the antitrust suit." The district court denied the defendant's motion,
refusing to construe the release as a bar to the plaintiff's antitrust cause of ac-
tion.78 Applying federal law, the district court in Three Rivers determined that
the release the plaintiff had signed did not cover prospective antitrust claims
because the plaintiff had not intended to release his rights under the antitrust
laws. 9
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the threshold issue of whether
federal law or state law controlled in interpreting the scope of the general
release." Since Congress had not prescribed a federal rule for construing
releases of antitrust claims, the court considered whether state or federal law
would better serve the policies implicit in the antitrust laws. 8' The Three
Rivers court noted that the relevant factors in analyzing the choice of law
issue are the need for a uniform federal rule,8" the extent to which the transac-
tion in question is one traditionally subject to state law,83 and the possibility
that the use of a state rule would frustrate the operation of the federal
statutory scheme. '
The Third Circuit noted that the need for a uniform federal rule may
arise when the use of diverse state laws would hinder the efficient operation of
a federal program." The Three Rivers court, however, determined that uni-
form interpretive rules are not necessary in construing releases of antitrust
claims since private parties bargaining for a release are not affected by the
variousness of state laws.86 According to the Third Circuit, a uniform federal
rule would have little utility because the parties to a release can phrase the
agreement in terms compatible with the law of the state in which the parties
will enforce the release.' The court, therefore, concluded that the need for
77. See 522 F.2d at 887.
78. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 620, 633 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(release does not bar plaintiff's antitrust claim), rev'd, 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
79. See 374 F. Supp. at 629.
80. See 522 F.2d at 888.
81. See id. at 889.
82. Id.; see U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-03 (1966) (need for uni-
form federal rules exists when absence of uniformity would threaten efficient operation of federal
program); see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) (uniform federal
rules may be necessary to decide matters vitally affecting federal interests).
83. See 522 F.2d at 889; see also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352-58 (1966) (hold-
ing that state law should govern matters primarily of local concern that arise from implementation
of federal statutory program).
84. See 522 F.2d at 889-90; see also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966) (court should consider extent to which application of state law would conflict with federal
statutory policy interests in deciding whether to apply federal law to federal statutory issues). See
generally Comment, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 823, 830-34 (discussing development of criteria for deciding whether to apply state or
federal law to federal statutory issues).
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uniformity in construing releases of antitrust claims was not sufficient to re-
quire the application of federal law to interpret the release in Three Rivers.8
Furthermore, the Third Circuit found that the use of state law rather than
federal law to interpret the release would be more appropriate because state
law customarily controls the enforceability of private contracts. 9 Since
private parties usually refer to state law when formulating the terms of a
release, the Three Rivers court reasoned that applying federal law to construe
the agreement could subvert the intentions and expectations of the contract-
ing parties. 90 The court, therefore, emphasized that absent a substantial need
for applying uniform federal law to interpret releases of antitrust claims, the
law of private contracts should not be burdened with the complication of a
separate rule for releasing an antitrust cause of action.9 '
Finally, the court in Three Rivers determined that the use of state law to
interpret releases of antitrust claims would not frustrate the effectuation of
federal policy objectives under the antitrust laws.92 The Third Circuit stated
that releases of private antitrust claims generally are not contrary to federal
antitrust policy.93 The court further noted that the applicable Pennsylvania
rule for construing the scope of releases was not incongruous with federal an-
titrust objectives.94 The Three Rivers court observed that under Pennsylvania
law, the intention of the parties governs the construction of releases, and the
parties must execute the instrument free from fraud or duress in order for the
release to be binding. 5 Since Pennsylvania law adequately protects against
88. See id. at 890-91. In determining that no need for uniform rules exists with respect to the
interpretation of antitrust releases, the Three Rivers court distinguished the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. in which the Court adopted a uniform rule
to govern the effect of an antitrust release on joint tortfeasors. See id.; Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1971) (intention of parties to release of antitrust
claim governs effect of release on unnamed joint tortfeasors). The Three Rivers court recognized
that uniform federal rules are necessary when multistate joint tortfeasors are involved to insure
that plaintiffs do not frustrate the enforcement of antitrust laws by inadvertently releasing their
claims against co-defendants in other states. See 522 F.2d at 891. The court, however, reasoned
that uniform rules are not needed for interpreting releases of antitrust claims because such multi-
state enforcement problems do not exist when courts construe the terms of a release. See id.
89. See 522 F.2d at 891.
90. Id.; see also Novak v. General Elec. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (in-
terpreting releases according to federal law could create difficulties for litigants since parties draft
releases by referring to state law).
91. See 522 F.2d at 891.
92. See id. at 891-93.
93. Id. at 892; see also Fabert Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir.)
(releases of antitrust claims are not contrary to public policy), cert. denied, 384 U.S 939 (1966).
The Three Rivers court noted that Congress provided the private cause of action under the anti-
trust laws as a supplemental means of enforcing the federal statutory scheme, complementing the
public cause of action enforceable by the federal government. See 522 F.2d at 891. Since releases
of private antitrust claims have no effect on the government's remedies against the antitrust vio-
lator, the court reasoned that such releases do not frustrate the effectuation of federal policy under
the antitrust laws. See id. at 892.
94. See 522 F.2d at 892.
95. See Evans v. Marks, 421 Pa. 146, -. , 218 A.2d 802, 805-06 (1966) (intention of parties
controls effect of release).
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the antitrust violator's use of deception to avoid an antitrust claim, the Third
Circuit determined that the use of Pennsylvania law to interpret the releases
of the antitrust claim in Three Rivers was consistent with federal antitrust
policy objectives. 96 Applying Pennsylvania law, the court found that the gen-
eral release was a bar to the plaintiff's antitrust claim.97 The Third Circuit,
therefore, remanded the case to the district court with directions to grant the
defendant's motion to dismiss the antitrust suit. 9
Implicit in the Three Rivers court's reasoning is the proposition that in
the absence of a conflict between an applicable state law and the federal
policy interests under a statutory program, no compelling need exists to for-
mulate a federal rule to interpret releases of federal statutory claims. 99 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Novak v. General
Electric Corporation 00 similarly recognized that the mere implication of a
federal statutory right does not mandate the application of federal law to all
matters relating to that right.'"' As in Three Rivers, the issue in Novak con-
cerned the scope of a general release of an antitrust claim.' 2 The plaintiff in
Novak had filed an earlier suit against one of the defendants, alleging that the
defendant had violated the Robinson-Patman Act by engaging in price dis-
crimination with respect to the sale of antifreeze.'0 3 During the pendency of
the prior suit, the parties had negotiated a release, and the court had entered
judgment dismissing the suit with prejudice.' 4 A year and a half later, the
plaintiff instituted a second antitrust suit against the same defendant and an
additional party, alleging that the defendants had engaged in price discrimina-
tion in the sale of automotive parts.' 5 The defendants moved for summary
96. See 522 F.2d at 892.
97. See id. at 893-97.
98. Id. at 897.
99. See id. at 892 (applying Pennsylvania law to interpret alleged release of antitrust claim
because use of state rule would not contravene federal antitrust policy objectives); see also Re-
leases of Federal Claims, supra note 7, at 353 (respect for state interests requires that courts dis-
place state rules in construing releases of federal claims only when state rules are inconsistent with
federal policy). See generally Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1517-31
(1969) (suggesting that state rules of decision should govern areas of legitimate state concern unless
important federal policy interests require application of uniform federal rules) [hereinafter cited as
The Federal Common Law].
100. 282 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
101. See id. at 1016. In holding that state law could be applied to construe releases of anti-
trust claims, the court in Novak reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co. does not require federal courts to create uniform federal rules to
resolve all matters relating to federal statutory rights. See id.; supra notes 41-55 and accompanying
text (discussion of Dice). The Novak court observed that in Dice, the use of state law to determine
the validity of the release directly contravened federal policy under the FELA. See 282 F. Supp. at
1015. The Novak court, therefore, limited the use of Dice as precedent for creating uniform
federal law to construe releases of federal claims to situations in which the particular application
of state law conflicted with federal statutory policy. See id. at 1015-16.
102. See 282 F. Supp. at 1013.
103. See id. at 1012-13; 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(c) (1982) (Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act
prohibit price discrimination by persons engaged in interstate commerce).
104. See 282 F. Supp. at 1012.
105. See id. at 1012-1013.
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judgment on the ground that the release the parties had executed in the
previous litigation precluded the subsequent antitrust action. 06
In evaluating the defendant's motion, the Novak court addressed the
issue of whether New Jersey law or federal law should govern the applicability
of the earlier release to other antitrust violations.' 7 Like the Third Circuit in
Three Rivers, the Novak court considered three criteria in resolving the choice
of law issue, specifically, the need for a uniform national rule, the relation-
ship of the transaction to activities regularly subject to state law, and the im-
pact that state law would have on the effectuation of federal policy. I" Noting
that state law regularly controls the formulation and interpretation of con-
tracts, the Novak court reasoned that no need exists to create a superseding
body of federal law to control releases of antitrust claims unless the particular
use of state law would contravene federal policy.10 9 While the Novak court
acknowledged the supremacy of federal policy interests,11 the court empha-
sized that federal interests should not override the state's legitimate interest in
the field of private contracts unless the use of state law would threaten federal
policy concerns.' " The court found that the application of New Jersey law to
determine the effect of the release of the earlier antitrust claim affirmatively
supported federal antitrust policy because under the state rule of construction
the intent of the parties governs the scope of releases.'I Since the intention of
the parties was a question of fact not readily ascertainable from evidence sub-
mitted on a motion for summary judgment, the Novak court denied the
defendants' motion.' 13
As the court in Novak recognized, the creation of law by federal courts to
resolve issues relating to the operation of a federal statute must be based on a
106. See id. at 1013.
107. See id. at 1013-1019.
108. See id. at 1013. The Novak court emphasized that although the validity of releases of
antitrust claims involves a federally created right, federal courts need not formulate federal law to
decide every aspect of federal rights. Id. The court stated that federal courts should consider the is-
sue in light of the existing body of state law. Id.
109. See id. at 1017; see also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (solicitude for
legitimate state interests in matters of local concern mandates that federal courts should not dis-
place state law with federal law unless use of state rule would conflict with interests of federal
government).
110. See 282 F. Supp. at 1017; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
111. See 282 F. Supp. at 1017; see also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966) (federal courts should determine whether conflict exists between use of state law as rule of
decision and federal statutory policy before fashioning uniform federal rule); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (federal court may look to state rules of decision
if state law is compatible with federal policy).
112. See 282 F. Supp. at 1019. Under New Jersey law, a general release covers all claims
within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time they execute the release. See Billotti
v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 188 A.2d 24 (1963). The Novak court reasoned that the
New Jersey rule affirmatively supports federal antitrust policy since the state rule requires that the
parties knew and intended that the release would cover unknown antitrust claims, thereby preven-
ting the unintentional release of unknown antitrust claims. See 282 F. Supp. at 1023.
113. See 282 F. Supp. at 1023.
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need to safeguard the policy interests implicit in the statutory scheme.'" Since
federal legislation rarely prescribes the rules of decision for all statutory
issues,' the law of the states necessarily fills in interstitially where Congress
had not declared the governing law." 6 State law, therefore, provides the
backdrop against which a federal statutory program operates." 7 Congres-
sional reliance on state law to supplement federal enactments translates into a
presumption that state law will supply the rule of decision for issues arising
from the operation of a federal statute unless Congress or the courts prescribe
otherwise.'I-The power of the federal courts to create federal law to resolve
statutory issues, however, is not comparable to that of Congress because the
federal courts are not granted any constitutional authority to make law.19
Judicial power to formulate federal common law depends on the existence of
a cognizable federal interest that requires the protection of federally declared
standards. 20
The federal government's significant interest in promoting federal policy
objectives implicit in legislative programs warrants the creation of uniform
federal rules to decide certain issues relating to the implementation of the
114. See 282 F. Supp. at 1015-19 (noting that federal courts generally examine whether crea-
tion of uniform federal rules is necessary to ensure effectuation of federal policy); see also Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal courts have power to fashion
uniform federal rules when necessary to effective implementation of federal statutory program);
cf. Federal Judicial Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 172-73 (federal courts lack competence
to choose governing law if issue does not implicate significant federal interest).
115. See supra note 1 (federal statutory enactments rarely prescribe rules governing all
relationships affected by statute).
116. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 470 (2d ed. 1973) (legal systems of states fill in in-
terstitially where federal law does not operate) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
117. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 116, at 471 (Congress legislates against background
of state substantive law).
118. See The Federal Common Law, supra note 99, at 1517-19 (suggesting that preexisting
state law presumably governs relationships between individuals until Congress or courts interpose
federal law). Federal statutory enactments build upon preexisting legal relationships established
under state law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 116, at 471. Congress essentially acts against
the background of state law in the same way that state legislatures act against the background of
the common law. Id. State law, like the common law, is assumed to govern unless the state legisla-
ture prescribes a different rule. Id.
119. See Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1682-83 (1974) (fact that Congress has constitutional power to create federal law does not imply
that federal courts have comparable power to fashion federal rules of decision). See generally The
Federal Common Law, supra note 99, at 1512-31 (discussing limits on federal judicial lawmaking
power).
120. See Federal Judicial Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 178 (federal courts derive au-
thority to create federal law from presence of federal interest that warrants judicial protection);
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084,
1090 (1964) (federal judicial lawmaking competence is limited to statutory issues in which federal
government has significant interest); see also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966) (refusing to apply federal law to construe lease contracts under Mineral Leasing Act
because no significant federal interests exists in such contracts).
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statute.' 2 ' Uniform federal rules may be necessary to ensure that statutory
issues are accorded uniform treatment in every jurisdiction.'22 Additionally,
the effective administration of a federal program may require the promulga-
tion of uniform standards if the diversity of state law would impose substan-
tial administrative burdens.' 2 Finally, the creation of uniform federal rules is
justified whenever a particular state law conflicts with an established federal
statutory policy."'
When federal courts formulate and apply federal law to statutory issues
normally decided under state law, however, a corresponding disruption of
state regulation necessarily will result from the displacement of state law by
federal law."' An important state interest in the implementation of a federal
statute, therefore, is preventing or limiting the disruption of state regulation
that could occur if activities which customarily are subject to state law were
evaluated according to a different set of federal rules. 2 6 The interest of state
governments in limiting the disruption of state regulation is the counterpart to
the federal government's interest in having uniform federal law govern all
aspects of a federal statutory program.'" In deference to this legitimate state
121. See D'Oench Dudme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (federal courts should create federal law to resolve federal statutory
issues when necessary to ensure effectuation of implicit statutory policies).
122. See Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) (uniform federal
rules for construing collective bargaining agreements are necessary to ensure that remedies under
Labor Management Relations Act are administered similarly in every jurisdiction).
123. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (uniform federal
rules must govern transactions in government-issued commercial paper because variousness of
state laws could subject rights and duties of federal government to considerable uncertainty); see
also United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 438 F.2d 809, 813-14 (5th Cir. 1971) (uniform
federal rules must govern rights of federal government in commercial paper transactions); United
States v. Terry, 554 F.2d 685, 692 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal law should be employed when use of
varying state rules could hamper effectiveness of federal program).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597 (1973)
(federal court must reject state law in favor of uniform federal law if state rule is hostile to federal
policy interests); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (federal courts
should displace state law with uniform federal rule if state law conflicts with federal statutory
policy); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (state rules that defeat in-
tent of federal statutory scheme must be rejected in favor of federal law).
125. See Comment, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test,
43 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 841 (1976) (application of federal law to essentially local activities could
disrupt state regulation of those activities) [hereinafter cited as Adopting State Law].
126. See id. at 843; supra note 10 (discussing state's interest in preventing disruption of state
regulation of private contracts). In addition to causing a disruption of state regulation of local
matters, the imposition of uniform federal rules on localized activities could create confusion
and uncertainty for private individuals because of the existence of two separate standards for
evaluating similar conduct. See Novak v. General Elec. Co., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (use of
federal law to construe antitrust releases could create difficulties for parties by imposing separate
federal rule for releasing antitrust claims); see also The Federal Common Law, supra note 99,
at 1531 (individuals would prefer to have one source of law governing same or similar transactions).
127. See Adopting State Law, supra note 125, at 843 (state interest in avoiding disruptive ef-
fects of imposing federal law on local transactions is counterpart of federal interest in uniformity).
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interest, the Supreme Court has refrained from applying federal law to areas
of traditional local concern such as domestic relations'28 and real property
transactions' 9 when issues bearing on these matters arise in the context of a
federal statute.'3 0 Nevertheless, the state's interest in regulating areas of local
concern has been overriden, and federal law applied, when state law did not
serve the policy goals of a federal statutory scheme.3
The enforceability of releases and settlements of federal statutory claims
implicates both federal policy interests and state interests in regulating the
contractual behavior of private parties. 3 2 Since questions relating to the
validity of releases of federal claims involve the interests of both the state and
federal governments, the choice of law for deciding such issues must entail a
balancing of the competing interests. 3 3 The inquiry, therefore, becomes
whether the need for uniform federal rules to interpret releases of federal
statutory claims outweighs the state's interest in preventing the disruption of
state control over the contractual activities of private parties.34
The weight to be accorded the need for uniformity depends on the extent
to which uniform federal rules for construing releases of federal claims ac-
tually would serve the interests of the federal government. 3 Uniform rules
128. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 348-58 (1966) (applying Texas law to permit
defense of coverture to federal government's suit on loan from Small Business Administration be-
cause of significant state interest in protecting contractual rights of married women); see also De-
Sylvia v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956) (applying California law to define statutory
meaning of "children" in Copyright Act because of important state interest in matters affecting
domestic relations).
129. See United States v. Brosman, 363 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1960) (applying Pennsylvania law
to determine extent of "property and rights to property" for purposes of federal tax lien because
possible disruption of local property relationships outweighed need for uniform rule).
130. See supra notes 128-29 (discussing cases in which Supreme Court chose to apply state
law to decide federal statutory issues bearing on matters of local concern).
131. See United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting use of California rule barring post-foreclosure waste actions in suit brought under Na-
tional Housing Act because state rule would have hampered effectuation of policy under Act); see
also United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 910-11 (8th Cir. 1974) (court refused to apply North
Dakota rule that precluded granting of easement to federal government because state law hindered
federal policy under Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act of preserving breeding areas of migratory
birds).
132. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (releases of federal statutory claims im-
plicate significant state and federal interests).
133. See Novak v. General Elec. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (courts must
balance competing interests of state and federal governments when examining relationships that
affect those interests); see also Releases of Federal Claims, supra note 7, at 353 (courts should
balance state and federal interests when choosing applicable law for determining enforceability of
releases of federal claims).
134. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1975)
(court should balance need for uniform rules for construing releases of federal antitrust claims
against possible disruption of state regulation of private contracts); see also Novak v. General
Elec. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (court should consider necessity for uniform
rules of decision and whether state law normally controls transaction in question before choosing
applicable law for construing transaction).
135. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966) (need for uniform rules
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must be shown to promote a federal interest because the consequence of im-
posing uniform federal standards on activities normally subject to state law is
a corresponding loss of uniformity in state regulation of these local activities
due to the existence of two distinct bodies of law. 36 Some federal courts,
however, have chosen to create uniform federal law to interpret releases of
federal claims without considering whether uniform rules are necessary for
the effectuation of federal policy interests."' Although uniformity of deci-
sional law could ease the burden of administering a federal statute," 38 a
generalized interest in administrative ease does not warrant the creation of
federal law to construe releases of federal claims unless the gains in efficiency
outweigh the disruptive effects of supplanting state law governing releases. 39
If, however, the use of varying state rules for interpreting the validity of
releases of federal claims would hinder the implementation of federal statu-
tory policy, federal courts would be justified in displacing state law with a
uniform federal standard. 4 A strong policy favoring the application of uni-
form federal rules is found in cases involving federal legislation aimed at rec-
tifying historical inequalities in bargaining power between employees and em-
depends on whether absence of uniformity would threaten achievement of federal statutory policy
goals); see generally Adopting State Law, supra note 125, at 839-42 (courts should give weight to
arguments for creating uniform federal rules only when interest in uniformity is specifically related
to effective implementation of federal program). In UA W v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., the
Supreme Court considered whether to prescribe a uniform statute of limitations provision for suits
brought under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See 383 U.S. at 701-08. Although
the Court recognized the importance of uniform national labor policy, the court concluded that a
uniform limitations rule was not necessary because a lack of uniformity was not likely to frustrate
the federal policy of promoting private settlement and conciliation in labor disputes. Id. at 702.
The Supreme Court, therefore, held that courts could apply state statutes of limitation in § 301
suits. Id. at 704-05.
136. See Adopting State Law, supra note 125, at 841-42 (use of uniform federal rules may
cause corresponding loss of uniformity in state regulation of local activities).
137. See, e.g., Ingram v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1316-17 & n.24 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying uniform federal rule to interpret release of antitrust claim); United States v. Orr
Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying federal law to construe settlement
agreement in case brought under Miller Act); Locofrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing,
Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying federal law to determine validity of release
of claim under federal securities laws); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 532 F. Supp. 923,
931-32 (D. Minn. 1982) (applying federal rule to construe validity of settlement agreement in pa-
tent infringement litigation).
138. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (uniform rules are
necessary to prevent uncertainty regarding rights and duties of federal government in issuance of
commercial paper); see also Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L. REv. 1428,
1438 (1960) (application of uniform federal rules may be desirable to simplify government's ad-
ministration of federal statutory program).
139. See Adopting State Law, supra note 125, at 841-42 (courts should carefully consider ef-
fect of imposing uniform federal rules on state and federal interests); cf. Mishkin, supra note 1, at
812 (choice of law decision should involve balancing possible gain from prescribing uniform
federal rule against potential losses from nonintegration of federal program with state activities).
140. See Releases of Federal Claims, supra note 7, at 348-49 (courts should displace state law
with uniform federal law only when necessary to foster federal policy interests); see also Adopting
State law, supra note 125, at 841 (federal courts should apply uniform federal rules if lack of uni-
formity resulting from variousness of state rules would interfere with effective implementation of
federal statute).
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ployers.' 14 The special solicitude for the statutory rights of claimants under
federal remedial legislation justifies the imposition of uniform federal rules to
safeguard those rights.' 42 The Supreme Court's decisions in Garrett and Dice
reflect such a concern for protecting the legal rights of individuals seeking the
benefits of federal remedial legislation.' 43 Both the Jones Act and the FELA
establish an affirmative governmental policy of ensuring compensation for
employees who are injured through the negligence of their employer.'44 Since
releases of personal injury claims under the Jones Act or the FELA extinguish
any rights of recovery the employee may have had, the Supreme Court in Gar-
rett and Dice understandably held that such releases warrant special scrutiny
under federally-declared standards.'"
The policy considerations that prompted the Supreme Court to apply
federal law to construe the releases in Garrett and Dice may not, however, be
prevalent in other federal legislation. The antitrust laws, for example, pro-
mote a public policy of detering anticompetitive business practices rather than
a policy of assuring compensation for the economic harm such practices may
cause.' 6 Moreover, unlike the Jones Act and the FELA, the effectuation of
141. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952)
(Federal Employers' Liability Act provides employees with right of action for injuries resulting
from employer's negligence); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 240 & n.2 (1942)
(Jones Act grants seamen right to recover damages for injuries negligently caused by employer);
Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler-Plymouth, 673 F.2d 1178, 1180 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (Truth in Lending Act
encourages consistent and fair treatment of borrowers by requiring lenders to fully disclose terms
of financing agreement); Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th Cir.
1981) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides employees with civil right of action against
employers who discriminate with regard to hiring or terms and conditions of employment); Ott v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1368 (6th Cir. 1975) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act
establishes right of action for employees who are discriminated against on basis of age).
142. See Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 114-15 (4th Cir. 1983)
(uniform federal rules are essential to protect and preserve individual rights of action under federal
remedial legislation); see also Federal Judicial Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 194-96 (signif-
icant federal interest in securing substantive rights of injured employees justifies creation of fed-
eral rules to interpret releases of federal rights of recovery).
143. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952)
(uniform federal rules must govern validity of releases and other devices employer may use to de-
feat substantive rights of injured employees under Federal Employers' Liability Act); Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942) (federal law must control enforceability of re-
leases of claims under Jones Act to ensure that injured seamen enjoy full benefit of substantive
rights under Act); supra notes 18-55 and accompanying test (discussion of Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Garrett and Dice).
144. See Federal JudicialLaw-Making Power, supra note 1, at 194-96 (Jones Act and Federal
Employer's Liability Act represent affirmative government intervention into employment relation-
ship to protect rights of employees injured through employer's negligence).
145. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359. 362 (1952) (rejecting
Ohio rule under which release was valid despite defendant's fraud in execution in favor of federal
rule that invalidated releases executed through deliberate fraud); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942) (rejecting Pennsylvania rule placing burden on plaintiff to prove in-
validity of release in favor of federal rule under which defendant has burden of proving that par-
ties executed release without fraud or coercion).
146. See Note, The Role of State Law in FederalAntitrust Treble DamageActions, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 1395, 1401-02 (1962) (primary purpose of antitrust laws is deterence of anticompetitive
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federal policy implicit in the antitrust laws does not depend entirely on the
preservation of private rights of action. 7 Private treble damage suits supple-
ment actions by the federal government as an additional means of enforcing
the antitrust laws.' 8 The impact of a release of a private antitrust claim on
the implementation of federal antitust policy, therefore, is not as significant
as in suits brought under either the Jones Act or the FELA." 9 Since the policy
implications of releases of private antitrust claims are relatively insubstantial,
the federal interest in the enforceability of antitrust releases is not sufficient
to warrant the creation and application of uniform federal rules to construe
such agreements.' 50
Given the acknowledged interest of state governments in the regulation of
private contracts,'51 the propriety of displacing state law with federal law as
the'rule of decision for interpreting releases of federal claims should depend
on the presence of a federal interest sufficient to override the legitimate state
interest.' 1 If the application of state law to construe a release of a federal
claim clearly would compromise federal interests in the effectuation of
statutory policy, federal courts should apply federal law as the rule of deci-
sion. '53 Absent such a conflict between state law and federal policy, however,
federal courts should refrain from creating an independent federal rule to
govern releases of federal statutory claims.
THoMAs CHRISTOPHER HAVENS
business practices while compensation of injured parties is secondary goal).
147. See Federal Judicial Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 196 (enforcement of antitrust
prohibitions is not exclusively dependent upon private treble damage suits). Enforcement of both
the Jones Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act is entirely dependent upon private suits
against the employer for damages. See id.
148. See Byram Concretetanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prod. Co., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d
Cir. 1967) (private tr ble damage actions are means of enforcing antitrust laws in addition to gov-
ernment prosecutions; 15 U.S.C. § 15 (c) & (f) (1982) (state and United States Attorneys General
are authorized to bri jg suit to enforce provisions of Clayton Act); see also Three Rivers Motors
Co. v. Ford Motor op., 522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir. 1975) (releases of private antitrust claims do
not affect government's remedies against antitrust violators).
149. Cf. Federal Judicial Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 196 (releases of claims under
Federal Employers' Liability Act and Jones Act have policy implications that are absent when
private parties release antitrust claims).
150. See id. at 196-97 (federal government does not have interest in issue of interpretation of
antitrust releases sufficient to justify creation of federal rules to construe such releases); supra note
120 and accompanying text (creation of federal law to decide issues relating to federal statute
depends on existence of significant federal interest in subject matter of dispute).
151. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing interest of state governments in en-
forceability of releases).
152. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (significant state interest in matters
of local concern should not be overridden unless application of state law would impinge upon leg-
itimate federal interests).
153. See Releases of Federal Claims, supra note 7, at 353 (federal courts should reject state
rules for construing releases of federal claims only if state law is incompatible with federal stat-
utory policy).
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